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Abstract: Climate change impacts on coastal zones could be significant unless adaptation is
undertaken. A large fraction of population and economic activities located in these
areas will be at risk from coastal inundation. One particular macro-economic dimension
of sea level rise (SLR) impacts that has received no attention so far is the potential
stress of SLR impacts on public budgets and on debt sustainability. Adaptation will
require increased public expenditure to protect public and private assets at risk, and
could reduce or increase the stress on public budgets. This paper analyses the
macroeconomic effects of SLR adaptation, as well as the impacts on public finance
and on the dynamics of deficit and debt. We include fiscal indicators in climate change
impact and adaptation assessments focusing on the costs of SLR impacts and
adaptation using a computable general equilibrium model extended with a detailed
description of the public sector. We assume that coastal protection expenditure is
financed issuing government bonds, which means that coastal adaptation may place
an additional burden on public finance sustainability. SLR impacts are examined using
several scenarios linked to three different Representative Concentration Pathways:
2.6, 4.5 and 8.5, and two Shared Socio-economic Pathways: SSP2 and SSP5. Future
projections of direct damages of mean and extreme SLR and adaptation costs are
generated by the Dynamic Interactive Vulnerability Assessment modelling framework.
In a scenario where there is no adaptation, all world regions suffer a loss. Without
adaptation, public deficits increase respect to the reference scenario. A higher deficit
Powered by Editorial Manager® and ProduXion Manager® from Aries Systems Corporation
implies higher government borrowing from household savings reducing available
resources for private investments therefore decreasing capital accumulation and
growth. The benefits of adaptation result from two mechanisms: i) the avoided direct
impacts, and ii) a reduced public deficit effect. With lower deficits governments borrow
less from households’ savings and pay a lower debt service. This allows for an
increased capital accumulation, suggesting that support to adaptation in deficit
spending might trigger positive effects on public finance sustainability.
Response to Reviewers: Responses to the Deputy Editor and reviewers’ comments and are attached to the
revised manuscript.
We thank both reviewers and the Deputy Editor for the useful comments and
suggestions that contributed to improve our paper. We have addressed all comments
which are detailed in a separate file with our response to the reviewers.
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Response to reviewers’ comments 
 
We thank both reviewers and the Deputy Editor for the useful comments and suggestions that 
contributed to improve our paper.  Below we address all comments in detail: 
 
 
Reply to Deputy Editor  
 
As the mechanism discussed in the paper seems not unique for SLR 
- but could also be relevant for other forms of adaptation - I 
would like to see in the article some discussion for the broader 
implications for cost-benefit analysis (including the ones in 
more simpler models). Such discussion would address the question 
how SLR is similar/different from other forms of impacts in this 
context and also some discussion on the uncertainty given we are 
dealing with long-term models (particularly in relation to CGEs 
which are basically developed for short-term analysis). 
 
Following the Deputy editor suggestion, we added the following text in the discussion section of 
the revised manuscript: 
 
“…, this applies to uncertainty related to the development of future socioeconomic scenarios. CGE models 
are meant to perform short to medium term analyses and are less reliable when the future can unfold 
quite differently from what implied by the calibrated parameterization. The standard way to deal with 
this issue is the one we followed here simulating different SSPs and providing a range of estimates 
taking into account diverse socioeconomic and climatic scenarios.” 
 
…. 
 
“On this note, this methodology could be applied to wider contexts than SLR to examine the effect of 
climate change adaptation measures when the public sector plays an important role in replacing or 
supporting private actions. An example in this vein is public support in disaster risk reduction (e.g. in the 
area of riverine floods) where both damages and public support are substantive. In other areas where 
private adaptation or insurance are working, (e.g. in the health sector) this approach can be less useful. 
 
Furthermore, the insights from our analysis support the idea of including long-term growth effects on 
cost-benefit analyses of climate change, considering also the trade-off between the adaptation (or 
mitigation) costs and long-term impacts that could accumulate in time affecting fiscal positions and 
growth in the long run.” 
 
  
Authors' Response to Reviewers' Comments
 Reply to reviewer N°1 
 
I would like to thank the authors for addressing my comments.   
 
The main finding of the paper is that the GDP growth that is 
lost due to climate driven damages reduces public revenues much 
more than the case where government increases/reduces its 
deficit/surplus to finance adaptation expenditures. The fact 
that certain governments could not borrow to undertake this 
expenditure is not examined as debt sustainability and risk 
premium on interest rates is not modelled. The results are 
driven by the cost estimates of the DIVA model (i.e. no 
adaptation leads to xxx loss of resources (10% of GDP) and 
adaptation expenditures to avoid the damages amount to 2% of 
GDP). The CGE model then is used to calculate the second order 
impacts and the fiscal impacts from undertaking these 
investments or not. I think these could be added in the 
discussion section of the paper.   
 
We thank the reviewer for this suggestion.  
 
Regarding the point on “The fact that certain governments could not borrow to undertake this 
expenditure is not examined as debt sustainability and risk premium on interest rates is not 
modelled.”, we already included that in the discussion section on page 12 of the revised 
manuscript: 
 “…it is well known that financing government expenditure through new debt can be particularly 
troublesome, especially for highly indebted countries, if this action is linked to a perception of 
increasing risk of payback. Markets will typically react asking for higher rewards and interest 
rates. This dynamic however is not present in our exercise which may lead to underestimate the 
cost of raising public fund.” 
 
We have included the other points in the discussion section on page 11: 
 
“Note that results are driven by the cost estimates of the DIVA model (that generally features 
lower adaptation costs than GDP losses), which are then used in the CGE model to calculate the 
second order impacts and the fiscal impacts from undertaking adaptation investments or not.” 
 
 
I would appreciate further clarification on the following two 
minor issues: 
 
1. On their revised text addressing comment 1 the write 
"...Results used in this paper differ from previous assessments 
(e.g. Ciscar et al 2012) due to new science and accompanying 
data (e.g. extreme water levels from Muis et al. 2017), and DIVA 
model upgrade".  Can you please make explicit statements on 
which is the new science and what are the specific DIVA model 
upgrades that drove these changes? 
 
We have extensively updated DIVA since Ciscar et al. 2012, as noted in the publications cited in 
the references of this reply added to the manuscript.  
This additional text has been added: 
 
“Results used in this paper differ from previous assessments (e.g. Ciscar et al 2012) due to new 
science and accompanying data. This includes new data sets on extreme water levels (Muis et 
al. 2017), topographic data (Jarvis et al., 2008; USGS, 2015), land level data relating to glacial 
isostatic adjustment (Peltier 2004), population exposed to flooding (Balk et al., 2006; CIESIN et 
al., 2011) and re-writing of algorithms with the latest science, such as a statistically derived 
asset to gross domestic product ratio based on Hallegatte et al. (2013) with the digital elevation 
data and depth-damage curves (Hinkel et al. 2014).” 
 
 
2. Why USA and Northern EU undertake much higher adaptation 
expenses (more than triple) than China and India that are more 
vulberable according to the damages estimated by the DIVA model. 
Can you please add a short sentence explaining this? 
 
We have added the following text in the discussion section (page 12) to explain this and refer 
also to Figure SM 10 which allows this comparison. 
 
 
“It is worth noting that some regions such as USA and North Europe may undertake higher adaptation 
expenditures than more vulnerable regions such as China and India (Figure SM 10). This is because 
adaptation responds to a demand-for-safety function driven by socio-economic indicators (GDP per 
capita and population density), that suggest higher protection levels (and thus higher costs) in richer 
areas like the USA and Northern Europe than in China and India.” 
  
Reply to reviewer N°2 
 
The authors have invested a great deal of work into revising 
their manuscript based on both reviewers' comments. 
I do see most of my comments addressed, and am particularly glad 
to see that this paper has developed into a very nuanced 
discussion of the pros and cons of the CGE modeling approach. I 
believe that many more economic modeling studies should be as 
transparent about the shortcomings of their respective 
methodological approach (and underlying [economic] theory). 
 
I still have one open point I would like the authors to address, 
since it still not clear to me what is actually being done in 
the assessment regarding extreme events. In the revised 
manuscript (p.2) the authors mention as one major novel 
contribution "considering: i) the damages of extreme sea-level 
events, i.e. those related to 1-10,000 year flood". In section 
2.3 (on p.7) the authors however state that the following DIVA 
output is used as input for the macroeconomic modeling: 
"b) Expected annual damages to assets by sea floods (million 
US$/year): mathematical expectation of damages to assets 
integrating from the 1-in-1 year flood to the 1-in-10,000 year 
flood. 
c) Expected annual number of people flooded per year 
(thousands/year): mathematical expectation of damages to people 
integrating from the 1-in-1 year flood to the 1-in-10,000 year 
flood." 
So the authors again only use expected damages. It doesn't 
really matter if you integrate from 1-in-1 year flood to the 1-
in-10,000 year flood or from 1-in-1 year flood to the 1-in-1,000 
year flood, as in the former case you multiply the damages to 
assets for 1-in-10,000 year flood with 0.0001, which means that 
moving from 1-in-1,000 to 1-in-10,000 doesn't add much to the 
expected annual damages. 
In a nutshell: I still don't think that this paper addresses "i) 
the damages of extreme sea-level events". The extremes are still 
"hiding" in the expected damages... 
 
In the introduction we do not claim we are addressing the damages of extreme sea-level events 
but that we include that information as an additional difference compared to the existing 
literature based on CGE assessments.  
It is true that the DIVA framework only computes expected damages and that single extreme 
events can cause damages much higher than the expected damages. However, when looking 
into the future, computing expected damages is the best we can do. It is not possible to predict 
the time and place where future extreme events will occur. The expected damages give an 
indication where high damages could potentially occur and also allow an assessment over 
longer time periods where single extreme events hide in long-term averages. 
 
We have added the following test to clarify this point on page 2. 
 
“We acknowledge that single extreme events can cause damages much higher than the 
expected damages, and that properly assessing extreme events would require a different 
approach. However, the expected damages give an indication where high damages could 
potentially occur and also allow for an assessment over longer time periods where single 
extreme events are included as part of long-term average damages.” 
 
 
Please also carefully check for typos and grammar - I also found 
some new ones in the revised text. 
 
We have checked the manuscript for typos and grammar. 
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Abstract 
Climate change impacts on coastal zones could be significant unless adaptation is undertaken. One 
particular macro-economic dimension of sea level rise (SLR) impacts that has received no attention so 
far is the potential stress of SLR impacts on public budgets. Adaptation will require increased public 
expenditure to protect assets at risk and could put additional stress on public budgets. We analyse the 
macroeconomic effects of SLR adaptation and impacts on public budgets. We include fiscal indicators 
in a climate change impact assessment focusing on SLR impacts and adaptation costs using a 
computable general equilibrium model extended with a detailed description of the public sector. 
Coastal protection expenditure is financed issuing government bonds, meaning that coastal adaptation 
places an additional burden on public budgets. SLR impacts are examined using several scenarios 
linked to three different Representative Concentration Pathways: 2.6, 4.5 and 8.5, and two Shared 
Socio-economic Pathways: SSP2 and SSP5. Future projections of direct damages of mean and 
extreme SLR and adaptation costs are generated by the Dynamic Interactive Vulnerability Assessment 
framework. Without adaptation, all world regions suffer a loss and public deficits increase respect to 
the reference scenario. Higher deficits imply higher government borrowing from household savings 
reducing available resources for private investments therefore decreasing capital accumulation and 
growth. Adaptation benefits result from two mechanisms: i) the avoided direct impacts, and ii) a 
reduced public deficit effect. This allows for an increased capital accumulation, suggesting that support 
to adaptation in deficit spending might trigger positive effects on public finance sustainability. 
Keywords: Adaptation, sea level rise, public budgets, sustainability, climate change, computable 
general equilibrium 
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Fiscal effects and the potential implications on economic growth of 
sea-level rise impacts and coastal zone protection  
 
1. Introduction 
Sea-level rise (SLR) threatens coastal zones, through salinization, flooding, erosion, land loss 
(Hoegh-Guldberg et al. 2018; Wong et al. 2014; Nicholls et al. 2007; Nicholls et al 1999), and 
damage to property and infrastructure, which along with associated disruptions could result in 
adverse economic effects unless adaptation is undertaken. As coastal zones contain large 
population densities and economic activities (World Bank, 2010; Neumann et al. 2015; 
McGranahan et al. 2007) compared with further inland, it is important to project the wider 
economic effects of adverse change. With rates of SLR projected to accelerate (Church et al. 
2013) and increasing populations and socioeconomic development, a larger number of people 
and assets will be at risk from coastal inundation unless further action is undertaken (Wong et 
al., 2014). For example, according to Hinkel et al. (2014) with 0.25m – 1.23m of SLR in 2100 
and no further adaptation, millions of people may be flooded, and annual losses may be 0.3%-
9.3% of GDP. Globally, the broad impacts and direct costs of SLR and adaptation have been 
well identified (e.g. Hinkel et al. 2015), but the wider macro-economic implications have not 
been fully analysed yet.  
One particular macro-economic dimension of SLR impacts that has received no attention so 
far is the potential stress on public budgets. This issue was initially introduced, in broader 
terms, by Heller (2003) indicating climate change as one of the major threats posed on public 
budgets in future decades along with demographic changes. On the one hand, fiscal revenues 
could be significantly reduced in countries depending on few climate sensitive economic 
sectors. On the other hand, public spending may increase to prevent impacts such as 
intensified incidence of vector borne diseases, population movements or stress on 
infrastructures. Against this background, public budgets could become affected by climate 
change as decreasing revenues along with rising expenditures would erode public sector’s 
ability to pay, especially if long-term economic growth potential becomes compromised (Farid 
et al., 2016).  
Most of the discussion and research on fiscal effects has however focused on mitigation 
because of the direct effects on public budgets through variations in tax revenues due to 
policy implementation. There is a vast literature, developed especially during the 1990s, 
dealing with fiscal implications of carbon-energy taxes, revenue rising potential, re-
distributional implications, as well as costs and fiscal efficiency of green fiscal reforms (see 
e.g. Park and Pezzey, 1998; Bosello et al., 2001; and Schoeb, 2005 for surveys).  Much 
thinner is the literature concerning fiscal implications of climate change impacts and 
adaptation. Ekins and Speck (2013) discuss extensively the fiscal sustainability concept in 
relation with climate change impacts and policies highlighting the need to investigate their 
connections. Jones et al. (2013) review the corresponding fiscal challenges posed by climate 
change mitigation and adaptation describing climate change as a fiscal issue and stressing 
the fact that climate change impacts will indirectly affect government revenues and 
expenditures. Within the disaster risk management literature Hochrainer-Stigler et al. (2014) 
focus on the fiscal implications of climate-related impacts by employing risk-based modelling 
techniques and considering estimates related to current climate which could be used as a 
baseline for discussion of projected risks.  
For completeness, it is worth mentioning the studies providing quantifications of adaptation 
costs and finance needs for adaptation (see e.g. Buchner et al. 2015, UNEP 2016). 
Manuscript Click here to access/download;Manuscript;Revised Manuscript
rev2.docx
Click here to view linked References
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Nonetheless, macro-economic assessments investigating this issue are scarce. Still, using a 
systemic approach able to address all direct and indirect effects on the economy can be useful 
as emphasized by Ekins and Speck (2013). Consolidated tools for assessing economy-wide 
effects are Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models which include feedbacks and 
interdependencies between different markets. Indeed, CGE analyses have been widely 
applied to the economic assessment of climate change impact, but fiscal consequences have 
been somewhat left aside. To the best of our knowledge, only Bachner and Bednar-Friedl 
(2018) addressed with a CGE model how public budgets are affected by climate change. 
Investigating ten different impact areas in Austria, they find that macro-economic feedback 
effects on the overall tax base double the initial direct effect on the expenditure side of public 
budgets.  
Applying this approach to study fiscal implications of coastal protection is relevant as, on the 
one hand, the vast majority of investments against SLR in Europe are indeed publicly financed 
(CEPS and ZEW 2010, Nicholls et al.2010). On the other hand, insufficient protection would 
anyway increase public expenditure through disaster relief payments and compensation 
schemes. Both channels will affect public budgets. Eventually, adaptation could reduce or 
increase the stress on public budgets depending on its effectiveness, the structure of the tax 
system, the size of adaptation investment, and the funding sources available (Osberghaus 
and Reif 2010). 
It is also important to highlight the difference between mitigation and planned adaptation. The 
impact of the former on public budgets is much more direct, especially when implemented 
through carbon energy taxes or subsidies. The latter operates mostly through regulation or 
through public expenditure programs that are not financed by dedicated taxes, but by the 
general taxation. Thus, the budgetary implications are more difficult to track.    
A wide range of studies assess economic impacts of climate change-induced SLR using CGE 
models either analysing SLR as a single impact (Darwin and Tol 2001; Bosello et al. 2007; 
Bosello et al. 2012a; Pycroft et al. 2015 and Tol et al. 2016, Joshi et al., 2016), or including 
SLR as part of a wider set of impacts (Deke et al. 2001; Bigano et al. 2008; Eboli et al. 2010; 
Ciscar et al. 2009, 2011, 2012, 2014, 2018; Aaheim et al. 2012; Roson and van der 
Mensbrugge 2012; Bosello et al. 2012b; Dellink et al. 2014; OECD 2015).  
The main contribution of this paper is to address, differently from the abovementioned studies, 
the missing inclusion of fiscal indicators in climate change impact and adaptation 
assessments. Additional differences of this paper compared to previous studies are 
considering: i) the inclusion of damages of extreme sea-level events, i.e. those related to 1-
10,000 year flood, jointly and ii) including those damages as capital stock losses in a recursive 
dynamic setting. The focus of previous CGE studies is the gradual loss of capital stock related 
to land submerged by mean sea-level examined in comparative static exercises. Extreme sea-
level events, although less frequent, could potentially induce a much higher damage on 
coastal assets, dynamic effects on growth and higher demand for protection. We acknowledge 
that single extreme events can cause damages much higher than the expected damages, and 
that properly assessing extreme events would require a different approach. However, the 
expected damages give an indication where high damages could potentially occur and also 
allow for an assessment over longer time periods where single extreme events are included 
as part of long-term average damages. 
In this paper SLR is investigated with a recursive-dynamic CGE model extended with a 
detailed description of the public sector (Delpiazzo et al. 2017) that enables the analysis of 
macro-economic effects of adaptation and impacts on public budgets. More specifically, we 
evaluate the economic implication of SLR-induced land and capital losses as well as labour 
productivity effects due to temporary labour force displacements without and with coastal 
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protection financed issuing government bonds. The choice to support adaptation through 
public borrowing and not taxation is made on purpose, to study consequences in a potentially 
more stressful conditions for public funds.   
We examine several SLR scenarios originated by linking three different Representative 
Concentration Pathways (RCP): RCP 2.6, 4.5 and 8.5 (produced by two climate models), and 
two Shared Socio-economic Pathways (SSP): SSP2 and SSP5 while accounting for 
uncertainty in land-based ice melt. This combination allows us to span low, medium and high 
climate change futures and to account for different types of socio-economic development, and 
accordingly, different exposure to SLR: a medium one (SSP2) and a high one related to higher 
GDP and different population at risk (SSP5). For these scenarios, future projections of direct 
damages of mean and extreme SLR and adaptation costs are generated by the Dynamic 
Interactive Vulnerability Assessment (DIVA) modelling framework (Hinkel et al 2013, 2014; 
Vafeidis et al. 2008), an integrated socio-economical and geo-bio-physical model.  
As a final disclaimer: it is important to stress that we do not aim to perform an analysis of SLR 
risk. CGE models have many shortcomings under this respect. Rather, we apply CGE 
modelling to get insights of higher order effects on long-term debt sustainability of climate 
change impacts and adaptation expenditure in the specific context of coastal protection. 
 
2. Methodology 
Following a conceptual model from Sue Wing and Fisher-Vanden (2013), adaptation 
measures can be classified in three types. Type I is related to market-driven (autonomous) 
adaptation triggered by price signals. Type II refers to specific protective/defensive measures 
to reduce physical impacts. Type III consists of further compensating measures (e.g. fiscal 
policies) that reduce the adverse effects on economic sector’s productivity. Type I is standard 
in CGE models that feature endogenous price adjustments, but also the last two types, 
building the so-called planned adaptation, have ample potential to be implemented in CGE 
models (Sue Wing and Fisher-Vanden 2013).  
In the case of SLR, coastal protection expenditures mainly consist of large infrastructure 
expenditures which are primarily financed by public funds. According to CEPS and ZEW 
(2010) more than 95% of investments against SLR in Europe are publicly funded. Nicholls et 
al. (2010) suggest that much of the costs for adaptation to SLR falls on government finance 
while only a minority of adaptation (i.e. port and harbour upgrade) could be funded by private 
investments.  
Against this background, this work implements in a recursive-dynamic CGE model, public 
planned expenditures targeted to coastal protection inclusive of investment and maintenance 
costs corresponding to Type II adaptation measures. Cost estimation of coastal defences, 
consisting in sea dikes to protect against flooding, stems from the DIVA model. These are 
empirically derived based on a ‘demand for safety’ function based on per-capita income and 
population density (Hinkel et al. 2014 see Section 2.3). The DIVA model does not account for 
autonomous (Type I) adaptation, this is captured by the CGE model where resources allocate 
across sectors and countries responding to changes in relative prices.  
2.1. Overview of the ICES-XPS model 
The economic assessment is based on an extended version of the ICES CGE model used in 
climate change impact and policy assessments (Bosello and Parrado 2014; Bosello et al. 
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2012b; Eboli et al 2010). The basic version is a recursive-dynamic multi-sector multi-country 
CGE model derived from the GTAP model (Hertel et al. 1997). Like many global CGE models, 
ICES proposes a simplified representation of government behaviour. 
  
The original demand side in the model is represented by a utility maximizing regional 
household that allocates its income among private expenditure, public (government) 
expenditure, and savings. A budget constraint exists for the regional household as a whole but 
not for the government. Accordingly, government expenditures could, for instance, move in the 
opposite direction to taxes. Public debt and deficit are ignored, therefore the possibility for the 
public sector to save is not considered at all. This representation offers many advantages 
allowing for a single utility characterizing the demand side and avoiding complex public sector 
data issues on availability and homogeneity (for a more technical discussion refer to Delpiazzo 
et al. 2017 and Hertel 1997). However, it is inadequate when effects on public spending, like 
that of adaptation, have to be evaluated. To address this issue, we use the ICES-XPS (ICES-
eXtended Public Sector)1 model which features the government as a separate actor with its 
own budget constraint. Government transfers, consumption, and investments build 
government expenditure, while government income derives from taxes. At the regional level 
investments can be both private and public and are homogeneous. Furthermore, the model 
now includes items such as transfers between governments and households, and interest 
payments on debt stock. There are also transfers among governments.  
 
This section presents a short description of the public sector’s budget. A detailed description 
of the public sector is in Appendix A of the Supplementary Material (SM). In ICES-XPS, the 
government is a separate agent, whose income is affected by: (i) tax revenues (𝑇𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑟); (ii) 
net transfers to private households (𝑁𝑇𝑃𝐻𝑟); (iii) net interest payments to resident and non- 
resident households (𝑌𝐺𝐼𝑟); and (iv) net foreign transfers among governments (𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑟). 
Government income is used for consumption (𝐺𝑂𝑉_𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑟) and savings (𝑆𝐴𝑉_𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑟). The 
following two equations represent the government income respect to sources and uses. 
𝑌𝐺𝑟 = 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑟 + 𝑁𝑇𝑃𝐻𝑟 − 𝑌𝐺𝐼𝑟 + 𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑟 
𝑌𝐺𝑟 = 𝐺𝑂𝑉_𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑟 + 𝑆𝐴𝑉_𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑟 
Total regional investments are modelled through a Cobb-Douglas function of private and 
public investments. Regional investment net of depreciation (𝑁𝐸𝑇𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑟) is split into public 
(𝐺𝑂𝑉_𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑟) and private investments (𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑉_𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑟) according to fixed shares. 
𝑁𝐸𝑇𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑟 = 𝐺𝑂𝑉_𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑟 + 𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑉_𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑟 
The gap between public savings and public investments represent the government’s financial 
needs (borrowing). This gap is financed by households’ savings, since both domestic and 
foreign households supply a homogenous saving commodity. 
𝐺𝐵𝑂𝑅𝑟 = 𝐺𝑂𝑉_𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑟 − 𝑆𝐴𝑉_𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑟 
A positive value of 𝐺𝐵𝑂𝑅𝑟 means a deficit, thus the government is borrowing, while a negative 
sign means a surplus so that the government is lending resources. Then, public debt at the 
end of year t (GDEBTt,r) accumulates by adding current government’s borrowing (𝐺𝐵𝑂𝑅𝑡,𝑟) to 
the existing debt stock (𝐺𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑡−1,𝑟). 
                                               
1 The detailed description of the public sector in the ICES-XPS and the regional aggregation is in 
Appendix A of the Supplementary Material (SM). 
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𝐺𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑡,𝑟 = 𝐺𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑡−1,𝑟 + 𝐺𝐵𝑂𝑅𝑡,𝑟 
Interest payments on government’s debt stock (𝑌𝐺𝐼𝑟) are determined by a constant 
exogenous interest rate (𝑖𝑟𝑟=4%) multiplied by the related previous year debt stock.
2 
𝑌𝐺𝐼𝑡,𝑟 = 𝑖𝑟𝑟 ∙ 𝐺𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑡−1,𝑟 
 
Since public and private savings are homogenous goods, private households lend a fraction of 
their savings to governments and, as a consequence, governments pay interests to 
households. Thus, government borrowing reduces the available savings for productive 
investment purposes which in its turn will increase private sector interest rates given that 
investments demand will face a lower savings supply. Note that these interest rates are 
different from the constant interest rate set for public debt. 
 
The remaining features of ICES-XPS are similar to ICES. Output is produced by a 
representative firm in each sector using primary factors (land, labour, natural resources, 
capital), and other goods and services. Capital and labour are perfectly mobile domestically 
but immobile internationally. All data is available at the regional level and there is no distinction 
between urban and rural dimensions. Investment is allocated across countries to equalize 
expected rates of return to capital in the long-run. Savings and investments are equalized at 
the world level, but each region could have an imbalance between disposable savings and 
investment demand. This imbalance is closed by a surplus/deficit in foreign transactions 
(considered as the sum of trade surpluses/deficits and the net inflows of international 
transfers). In this context, government borrowing reduces the availability of regional savings 
with a consequent increase in saving prices which are negatively correlated to the rate of 
return to capital.  
2.2 Implementing adaptation in ICES-XPS model 
In our set up, ‘Planned Adaptation’ in coastal protection means investing in protective 
infrastructure, such as dikes to safeguard coastal zones where there are high population 
densities. Once these measures have been put in place (and assuming that maintenance 
occurs to ensure their effectiveness) only a residual damage will remain. However, adaptation 
is costly. Costs are of two types: i) investments in protective infrastructure, and ii) maintenance 
costs. We draw this information from DIVA (see next section). 
It is assumed that both expenditures are financed by private savings, through households 
buying government bonds. Thus, adaptation expenditures reduce the availability of savings for 
investment purposes. Furthermore, while expenditure in dike construction is accounted as 
public investment, maintenance costs expand government recurrent expenditure.  
                                               
2 The assumption that public debt is always refinanced at a constant rate is in fact a coarse 
simplification of the real world, ruling out the possibility to link interest rates to perceived changes in the 
debt-risk profile of a region (more on this on the discussion section). A straightforward alternative would 
have been to set the interest rate for public debt at the regional rates of return to capital endogenously 
computed by the CGE model. However, these are in fact decreasing in all our scenarios, as the 
embedded growth assumptions imply higher capital supply. As a consequence, the burden of the public 
debt would actually decrease leading perhaps to too optimistic conclusions about debt sustainability. 
The further option to model a more sophisticated public debt system with international capital markets 
and a financial module is left to further research. 
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Public investments with additional adaptation to cope with SLR (GOVINV_AD) in region r 
become:  
𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑁𝑉_𝐴𝐷𝑟 = 𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑟 + ∆𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐶𝑁𝑆𝑇,𝑟 
Where GOVINVr represents the initial public investments of region r, and ∆GOVINVCNST,r 
represents the additional public investment in infrastructure for the construction of dikes.  
Total recurrent government expenditures in region r (TQGr) is the sum of each recurrent 
expenditure (QGi,r) in good or service i: 
𝑇𝑄𝐺𝑟 = ∑ 𝑄𝐺𝑖,𝑟
𝑛
𝑖
 
Maintenance costs are additional recurrent public expenditures addressed to the construction 
sector that provides maintenance services (i=CNST). Similar to public investments with 
adaptation, the government demand for construction services with additional adaptation 
(QG_ADCNST,r) becomes: 
𝑄𝐺_𝐴𝐷𝐶𝑁𝑆𝑇,𝑟 =  𝑄𝐺𝐶𝑁𝑆𝑇,𝑟 + ∆𝑄𝐺𝐶𝑁𝑆𝑇,𝑟 
which ends up increasing total recurrent government expenditure by the same amount 
(∆QGCNST,r) to obtain total recurrent government expenditure with additional adaptation 
(TQG_ADr)  
𝑇𝑄𝐺_𝐴𝐷𝑟 = ∑ 𝑄𝐺𝑖,𝑟
𝑛
𝑖
+ ∆𝑄𝐺𝐶𝑁𝑆𝑇,𝑟 
This way of modelling adaptation expenditures implies that total public expenditure expands, 
and so does the public deficit, which is financed with private savings. This ends up reducing 
total savings each year. Due to public borrowing, interest payments increase which also 
augments the public deficit in the future. Hence, by conveying part of household savings to the 
funding of adaptation expenditures, planned adaptation decreases the total resources 
available to invest and build capital stock.3  
Therefore, this assessment can verify whether or not the lower growth of capital stock induced 
by adaptation is more than compensated by the lower climate-change induced losses on 
capital, land stock, and labour productivity; and how all this affects public budgets.   
2.3 Sea-level rise impacts and adaptation costs 
The direct damage costs of SLR and of coastal protection (building of sea dikes) are derived 
from the DIVA framework (Hinkel et al. 2014; Hinkel et al. 2013; Hinkel et al. 2012; Hinkel and 
Klein 2009). SLR leads to a range of coastal impacts including loss of land due to 
submergence by gradual SLR, damage to coastal assets due to higher extreme sea-level 
                                               
3 This way to model adaptation rules out the possibility for adaptation (and more generally public) 
expenditure to be expansive through multiplier effects. The model however is a general equilibrium one, 
with growth originated by savings and not by Keynesian demand-driven effects. Adding that feature to 
public adaptation would imply extending it also to all form of consumption changing the nature of model.  
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events, impeded drainage, salinity intrusion, enhanced coastal erosion and wetland change 
(Wong et al. 2014). Here we cover only the first two types of impacts as global impact 
estimates of the other types of impacts are difficult to obtain.  
Residual impacts depend on adaptation measures that in DIVA take the form of dike building. 
DIVA computes protection standards, directly connected to the height of dikes, for over 12,000 
sections of the world’s coast based on an empirically derived demand for safety function that 
is increasing with per-capita income and population density (Hinkel et al. 2014). The dike 
building process is stylized as data to derive current and future protection levels worldwide 
with higher granularity are not available. The demand for safety and thus of higher dikes 
depends positively on the SLR stressors (extreme water level), GDP per capita and population 
density. Accordingly, in DIVA coastal protection and the related costs - that include 
construction and annual maintenance costs - change because of environmental and socio-
economic drivers (for further detail see Hinkel et al 2014). Results used in this paper differ 
from previous assessments (e.g. Ciscar et al 2012) due to new science and accompanying 
data. This includes new data sets on extreme water levels (Muis et al. 2017), topographic data 
(Jarvis et al., 2008; USGS, 2015), land level data relating to glacial isostatic adjustment 
(Peltier 2004), population exposed to flooding (Balk et al., 2006; CIESIN et al., 2011) and re-
writing of algorithms with the latest science, such as a statistically derived asset to gross 
domestic product ratio based on Hallegatte et al. (2013) with the digital elevation data and 
depth-damage curves (Hinkel et al. 2014). 
Direct impacts and adaptation costs are computed for a “No additional adaptation scenario”, 
assuming constant protection at 1995 levels and for a “With adaptation scenario”, where the 
demand for safety increases with increasing affluence and higher dikes are built with rising 
sea-levels. The costs of coastal protection include construction and annual maintenance 
costs. Information is available in 5-year time steps. 
The No additional adaptation scenario could be considered not very realistic given that 
protection levels will not actually be frozen at 1995 levels. Nonetheless, this is a necessary 
reference point to enable a full account of the potential future contribution of adaptation 
expenditure on public budgets.  
For each combination of SLR and socio-economic scenario (with no additional adaptation and 
with adaptation), the following DIVA model output were used as input to ICES-XPS: 
a) Annual land loss due to submergence (km²/year): Land is considered to be 
unusable, and thus lost, if it is situated below the 1-in-1 year flood water level and 
not protected by a dike. 
b) Expected annual damages to assets by sea floods (million US$/year): 
mathematical expectation of damages to assets integrating from the 1-in-1 year 
flood to the 1-in-10,000 year flood. 
c) Expected annual number of people flooded per year (thousands/year): 
mathematical expectation of damages to people integrating from the 1-in-1 year 
flood to the 1-in-10,000 year flood. 
d) Annual cost of construction of new dikes as well as raising of existing dikes (million 
US$/year).  
e) Annual cost of maintaining existing dikes, projected at 1% of capital costs (million 
US$/year). Dikes that are overtopped by rising sea-level are no longer maintained. 
For a consistent flow of information across the two models, all values from DIVA, expressed in 
US$ PPP (Purchasing Power Parity) were converted to US$ MER (Market Exchange Rate), 
the ICES-XPS reference, using the conversion factors from the World Development Indicators 
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(World Bank 2017). The physical and economic data of the spatially resolved DIVA model 
were aggregated to match the ICES-XPS regions. Then we calculated the ratio of each 
monetary value to the corresponding GDP for each SSP. Finally, those ratios were applied to 
the ICES-XPS GDP database to compute the corresponding monetary values to be included 
as input for the CGE simulations.  
As in previous CGE assessments (Bosello et al. 2007, 2012a, 2012b), we assume that SLR 
impacts affect regional performances through land loss, labour productivity loss, and capital 
loss. The first is implemented in ICES-XPS decreasing the stock of productive land available 
to agriculture assuming this coincides with submerged land, which is commonly observed. 
Labour productivity is reduced assuming that people flooded are not able to work for 2 
working weeks per year.4 Capital stock is decreased according to the expected annual 
damages to assets by sea floods. This presupposes that all countries of the world would 
experience in every year a flood that provokes exactly the expected damage. We 
acknowledge this is unrealistic, but we keep this assumption for simplicity noting that our 
results, under this respect, can be placed in the high-range of damage estimates.5  
It is also worth noting that this is the first time that we are able to include explicit estimates of 
capital losses. Previous assessments run with prior versions of the same CGE model did not 
include them at all (Bigano et al, 2008; Bosello et al. 2012a; Eboli et al. 2010), or followed a 
rather coarse method imposing the same loss of land stock on capital stock (Bosello et al. 
2007, Bosello et al. 2012b, Bosello and Parrado 2014). This is an improvement to our impact 
analysis, and therefore, we should expect higher economy-wide impacts in this study.  
 
2.4 Scenarios 
The main drivers of the DIVA model are SLR and the evolution of population density and gross 
domestic product (GDP). Projections for both variables associated to two Shared 
Socioeconomic Pathways - SSP (O’Neill et al. 2014): SSP2 “Middle of the Road” and SSP5 
“Fossil-fuelled development”, both available at IIASA (2016) have been used in this study. The 
evolution of GDP, population, and capital stock for both scenarios is shown on Figure SM 1 of 
the Supplementary Material (SM).  
SLR scenarios generated from two climate models: Nor-ESM (Bentsen et al. 2013) and 
MIROC-ESM (Watanabe et al. 2011) and for three Representative Concentration Pathways 
(van Vuuren et al. 2011) were analysed: RCPs 2.6, 4.5, and 8.5. Furthermore, to account for 
uncertainty in land-based ice melt, the 5%, 50%, and 95% percentiles ice melting uncertainty 
were considered as representing a ‘very likely’ range for low, medium, and high SLR estimates 
                                               
4 This value is rather arbitrary and derives from assumptions made in Bosello et al (2012b) on the 
period of time that people will not be able to work after being affected by river floods. To control for the 
weight of this assumption we run a sensitivity analysis considering 1, 2, 4 and 6 weeks for the No 
Adaptation scenario with high SLR. Applying these periods does not change the final outcome of our 
estimates. There is some variability on impacts at the aggregate level for North Europe and Asian 
countries, but these variations do not change the overall results of our study. As a final remark, it has to 
be noted that the labour productivity effect represents anyway a minor share (1% to 16%) of the total 
impact. 
5 We acknowledge that the probability of this happening in reality is null. Addressing this would, 
however, require a quite different approach such as a Monte-Carlo analysis which we plan to address in 
the future.  
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in each scenario (see Figure SM 2). These regionalised (patterned) SLR scenarios are taken 
from Hinkel et al. (2014).6  
The general equilibrium analysis is developed comparing the adaptation scenarios against a 
reference scenario. 
Reference (no impact): Considering only the socio-economic scenarios based on the SSP2 
and SSP5. These scenarios do not include any impact from SLR.  
No additional adaptation: Including SLR impacts, as reported in section 2.3 and considering 
both socio-economic development and SLR. This represents a counter factual scenario with 
adaptation frozen at 1995 protection levels.  
With additional adaptation: Including public intervention to protect coastal zones against 
SLR as prescribed by the DIVA framework, considering both socio-economic development and 
SLR, including residual damages, imposed according to the description in section 2.3. In 
ICES-XPS we take into account only the additional costs for maintenance of the new 
infrastructure. Maintenance costs related to existing protection infrastructures are not a 
consequence of climate change impacts (Hinkel et al., 2014) and are thus assumed to be part 
of the reference scenario.  
3. Results 
Direct impacts of SLR and coastal protection provided by DIVA are summarised in Appendix D 
of the SM. Benefits are higher than costs, as amply recognised by an extended literature. This 
information constitutes the main input for the following CGE analysis meant to capture the 
economy-wide feedbacks and fiscal effects of protecting coastal zones, i.e. the role of 
autonomous adaptation.  
Macro-economic effects are summarised in Figure 1 comparing impacts on regional GDP by 
SSP for RCPs 2.6, 4.5, and 8.5 in 2050 with and without additional adaptation (full results are 
reported in Figure SM 5). The figure includes a boxplot with whiskers computed using 1.5 
times the interquartile range showing outliers outside that interval. The No additional 
adaptation scenarios feature a generalized GDP loss in all regions for all RCPs directly 
dependent on the size of impacts on capital, land, and labour productivity. The most affected 
region is China, which shows also a higher variability in impacts, with an average GDP loss of 
10% for SSP5 and 8.6% for SSP2. South Asia is the second most affected region in SSP5 
with an average GDP loss of 7.2% but a much lower one for SSP2 (3.3%). East Asia shows 
also high losses (SSP5: 5.6%, SSP2: 4.6%); along with North Europe (SSP5: 5.3%, SSP2: 
4.4%). In the rest of Asian countries, Middle East, Africa, Canada, Europe, Oceania, USA, 
Latin America and the Caribbean, GDP could decrease on average around 4% to 2%. The 
rest of the Former Soviet Union and Sub Saharan Africa show lower impacts with narrower 
loss intervals and an average below than 2% of GDP. 
 
 
Fig. 1 Impacts on real GDP by region, SSP, and RCP in 2050 (with and without additional 
adaptation) 
 
 
                                               
6 The regional patterns are from the Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets and their peripheral glaciers 
and ice caps, plus from the steric contribution of SLR. A global mean value is added to the regionalised 
components from glaciers and ice caps in other parts of the world. 
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By comparing results between SSP5 and SSP2, it emerges that higher growth implies higher 
exposure and impacts. As in the case of direct impacts, the variability in macro-economic 
results induced by differences in socioeconomic development is higher than that associated to 
the climate scenarios. This is a consequence of the time profile of our exercise, as by mid-
century, climate signals are quite similar across RCPs. The macro-economic benefits of 
coastal protection are substantial. Figure 1 clearly highlights the ability of adaptation to reduce 
GDP losses, particularly evident in those regions like Asian countries, where SLR has more 
pronounced impacts.  
This positive result of adaptation is the compounded effect of two mechanisms directly and 
indirectly related with SLR impacts. The first one regards the avoided direct impacts (loss of 
labour productivity, land, and capital). In this case, the avoided capital loss is the main driver 
of adaptation benefits, not only because of their size, but also due to their key role in 
determining growth in a recursive dynamic model like ICES-XPS.  
 
 
Fig. 2 Impacts on public deficit by region, SSPs and RCPs in 2050 (with and without 
additional adaptation) 
 
 
The second mechanism is the public deficit effect (Figure 2 and Figure 3) that has an indirect 
consequence on GDP growth. In 2050, without adaptation, all regions increase their public 
deficits or reduce their surpluses respect to the reference scenario. Region-specific results are 
strictly dependent on the tax system structure, and on the interaction between input taxes 
(affected by the negative effects on land, capital, and labour), and output taxes (affected by 
the decline in GDP). Public deficit expansion in non-Asian countries is mainly driven by the 
reduction in GDP and consequently lower tax revenues. In contrast, countries from Asia and 
the Middle East enlarge their deficit mainly due to an increase of public expenditures. This is 
due to the fact that these regions, being highly damaged by SLR experience a noticeable rise 
in prices due to a loss of endowments, in particular capital stock. This directly affects 
government expenditures. These increases can be substantive in absolute terms. In RCP8.5 
and high SLR for instance, they amount in 2050 to more than $800 billion in China, $236 
billion in Latin America and the Caribbean, $180 billion in India, and $171 billion in East Asia. 
Full results including decomposition of fiscal effects during the period 2008-2050 are reported 
in Figure SM 6, Figure SM 7, Figure SM 8, and Figure SM 9.  
A higher deficit implies higher government borrowing from household savings which eventually 
reduces also the available resources for private investments, decreasing capital accumulation 
and growth in the medium- and long-run.  
Adaptation translates the lower impacts of SLR into lower deficits with the government 
borrowing less from households which would allow for an increased capital accumulation in 
the long-run. Lower deficits imply also lower debt accumulation and a lower debt service. This 
allows more resources devoted to growth. Note that this result holds even though adaptation 
is funded issuing public debt. Figure 3 highlights the patterns in the evolution of deficit (with 
and without additional adaptation) in selected regions for the period 2007-2035. Initially, public 
deficits are in fact higher when adaptation investments are being put in place, but in the longer 
run they become lower as increasingly negative impacts are avoided. In the long-term GDP 
losses and public deficits would be much higher without adaptation (see Figure SM 5 and 
Figure SM 6). Eventually, according to the ICES-XPS analysis, the protection investments 
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prescribed by DIVA are also robust in a general equilibrium setup, i.e. accounting for the full 
economic interactions.  
 
Fig. 3 Impacts on public deficit by SSP and RCP for selected regions (with and without 
additional adaptation) 
 
 
Within this context and for the case of SLR, support to adaptation in deficit spending could 
improve GDP growth in the long-run and might trigger positive effects on public finance 
sustainability (see Figure SM 9 for the positive effect of adaptation in reducing the public 
deficit compared against the No additional adaptation case). 
  
4. Discussion 
This study’s macro-economic impacts of SLR are much higher than those reported by 
previous studies. For instance, the maximum loss from Bosello et al. (2007), Bigano et al, 
(2008), Eboli et al. (2010), Bosello et al. (2012a,b), and Bosello and Parrado (2014) is 0.4% of 
GDP in 2050. OECD (2015), which applies a similar methodology to simulate capital stock 
losses - i.e. capital decreases in pace with land loss - estimated a maximum GDP contraction 
of less than 1% in the Asian region in 2050. The PESETA III study (Ciscar et al. 2018) 
computes roughly a 0.3% GDP loss for the EU and around 0.5% for UK and Ireland. Our 
higher loss estimates are mainly due to three aspects. The first and most important is the use 
of extreme SLR estimates related to a 1-10,000 year flood which implies higher impact and 
adaptation costs. Related to this is the fact that capital losses have been estimated with the 
DIVA model and not inferred from land losses. The second, is the recursive dynamic setting 
that amplifies effects on growth compared to static exercises (as for instance Ciscar et al. 
2009, 2011, 2012, 2014, 2018). The third, pertains finally to the inclusion of public borrowing 
effect that crowds savings out and therefore investments with a further negative impact on 
growth. This is more evident in the no additional adaptation-high SLR scenarios where 
governments face larger deficits. Note that results are driven by the cost estimates of the DIVA 
model (that generally features lower adaptation costs than GDP losses), which are then used 
in the CGE model to calculate the second order impacts and the fiscal impacts from 
undertaking adaptation investments or not. 
In the No Adaptation scenarios governments must borrow more resources than in the 
Adaptation scenarios. In the former scenarios governments increase their deficits (and public 
debts) due to lower tax revenues or increased current expenditures, then they must borrow 
from private households to finance the deficit which ends up increasing public debt as well as 
the debt burden. On the contrary, in the Additional Adaptation scenarios, even though the 
government is borrowing to finance adaptation investments and maintenance costs, the 
benefits are higher than the burden of the adaptation debt, since with adaptation governments 
have either higher tax revenues or lower current expenditures.  
Debt sustainability could be compromised if interest payments become a heavy burden in 
public debts either because governments are borrowing more to refinance the existing debt or 
because interest rates are increasing due to a higher public debt. The evolution of public 
deficits is an indicator that reveals if public debt is becoming unsustainable because it is 
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increasing in time. Figure SM 9 shows the temporal profile for changes of public deficits 
thanks to SLR adaptation (black line) along with the deficit decomposition by its main 
components for one specific scenario (SSP2, RCP8.5 and high SLR simulation scenario 
produced with the MIROC-ESM climate model). Debt is more sustainable in the Additional 
Adaptation scenarios due to higher tax revenues (blue area) in most of Non-Asian countries, 
while Asian countries improve their deficits with Adaptation thanks to lower expenditures 
(Orange area), and lower public debt interest payments (light orange area). Only North Europe 
shows a slight increase in public deficit after 2030 and this is explained by the high 
investments in dike building that must be done by 2030 and the corresponding increase in 
dike maintenance costs afterwards as shown in the second panel of Figure SM 10. For the 
rest of countries, adaptation expenditures (shown in Figure SM 10), do not represent an 
additional burden for debt sustainability even though they are financed with public debts 
through adaptation funds since the public deficit (black line in Figure SM 9) is always lower 
than in the No Adaptation scenario.  
It is worth noting that some regions such as USA and North Europe may undertake higher 
adaptation expenditures than more vulnerable regions such as China and India (Figure SM 
10). This is because adaptation responds to a demand-for-safety function driven by socio-
economic indicators (GDP per capita and population density), that suggest higher protection 
levels (and thus higher costs) in richer areas like the USA and Northern Europe than in China 
and India. 
There are two features of the study that can underestimate, the first, and overestimate, the 
second, our results on growth and public finance. As to the first: it is well known that financing 
government expenditure through new debt can be particularly troublesome, especially for 
highly indebted countries, if this action is linked to a perception of increasing risk of payback. 
Markets will typically react asking for higher rewards and interest rates. This dynamic however 
is not present in our exercise which may lead to underestimate the cost of raising public fund. 
As said, the reference scenarios examined are all quite optimistic in terms of growth rates 
which implies in fact a decrease in interest rates (there is more capital supply). This decrease, 
albeit less pronounced, is present also in SLR scenarios. Thus, to avoid an excessive 
underestimation of the cost of a debt policy, we set a fixed public debt interest rate. A more 
realistic representation of the dynamics of interest rates would have required a substantive 
revision of the capital market that we leave for further work. Despite this, the private sector of 
each regional economy in the model still responds to endogenous interest rates that are 
higher when the more government borrows from households.  
This said, debt patterns in the adaptation scenarios, also in the initial simulation years when 
adaptation costs should prevail on benefits, do not change much compared with the baseline 
scenario. This would lead us to conclude that the debt-risk profile of the regions considered, 
will not be impacted too much by adaptation expenditure. Therefore, at the macro regional 
level considered at least, debt financing would not be rationed. However, this may not be the 
case for some individual countries. 
The second feature refers to the inability to account for the expansive nature of adaptation 
expenditure on capital stock, whose positive effect is instead confined to damage reduction. 
This model feature can lead to underestimate the benefit of adaptation. There are indeed 
possible corrections for this, but this would imply to modify not just government consumption, 
but all the demand side of the model introducing multiplicative demand effects, a route that we 
did not follow. We acknowledge that this is a limitation of the approach. At the same time, 
correcting for it would have very likely strengthened our results.    
A third point regards the disaster relief payments that have been disregarded in our analysis. 
While these payments can constitute an important part of public budgets, including them in 
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our CGE framework would have only increased the gap between the No Adaptation and 
Additional Adaptation scenarios. As a matter of fact, this kind of payments would have been 
financed by borrowing more resources from the private sector with the corresponding impact 
on economic growth, even though part of those resources would have returned to the 
economy in the form of reconstruction investments and expenditures. However, the final 
outcome of the analysis would have been similar. 
There is finally another important limitation inherent to a CGE assessment applied to the 
evaluation of extreme risk.7 Eventually, we assessed the indirect effects of expected annual 
losses. We tried to capture uncertainty through multi-scenario assessment, but the exercise 
remains basically a deterministic sensitivity analysis.  
On the one hand, this applies to uncertainty related to the development of future 
socioeconomic scenarios. CGE models are meant to perform short to medium term analyses 
and are less reliable when the future can unfold quite differently from what implied by the 
calibrated parameterization. The standard way to deal with this issue is the one we followed 
here simulating different SSPs and providing a range of estimates taking into account diverse 
socioeconomic and climatic scenarios. On the other hand, it applies to SLR uncertainty. The 
main mechanism at work (even though not the only one) are changes in relative prices. These 
features are ill suited to capture either the propagation effects of disasters or their occurrence 
pattern. That would require full account of the whole probability distribution and potentially use 
of the apparatus of extreme value theory.  
In fact, our aim is not to perform a risk analysis. To do this, other methodologies would be 
more appropriated (see Pol and Hinkel (2018) for a discussion on SLR uncertainty).  Some 
studies adopt for instance probabilistic sea-level projections (e.g. Diaz, 2016). Decision 
analyses for coastal risk management also provide an alternative investigation approach 
which among other is able to represent more realistically local/site-specific features. Sahin and 
Mohamed (2014) combine a system dynamics model with a geographical information system 
for a spatial and temporal assessment of SLR. Tamura et al. (2019) use empirical econometric 
estimations to provide global economic assessments of SLR for different RCP/SSP 
combinations. 
Moreover, there could be other macro-economic, but non-neo-classical modelling approaches, 
that could emphasize different outcomes. As said, for instance, demand-driven Keynesian or 
post-Keynesian models can measure and compare the multipliers associated to public and 
private consumption and investment and remove the simplifying assumption of perfect market 
clearing. Introducing market distortions and output gap is surely an important addition to the 
analysis of the public sector. Finally, the explicit introduction of financial markets could also 
provide different results based on the assumptions made.  
Still, we believe that applying CGE modelling can provide useful insights on the higher order 
effects of public expenditure on adaptation (in this case against SLR), by systemically linking 
and capturing endogenous feedbacks across the taxation system, debt and debt services, 
GDP, and trade.  
On this note, this methodology could be applied to wider contexts than SLR to examine the 
effect of climate change adaptation measures when the public sector plays an important role 
in replacing or supporting private actions. An example in this vein is public support in disaster 
risk reduction (e.g. in the area of riverine floods) where both damages and public support are 
                                               
7 We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out. 
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substantive. In other areas where private adaptation or insurance are working, (e.g. in the 
health sector) this approach can be less useful. 
 
Furthermore, the insights from our analysis support the idea of including long-term growth 
effects on cost-benefit analyses of climate change, considering also the trade-off between the 
adaptation (or mitigation) costs and long-term impacts that could accumulate in time affecting 
fiscal positions and growth in the long run. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper analyses the economic implications of publicly planned adaptation to protect 
coastal zones against SLR. Input to the analysis are labour productivity, land, and capital 
losses as well as coastal protection costs from DIVA model runs based on the combination of 
two SSPs (2 and 5), three RCPs (2.6, 4.5, and 8.5), two climate models (NorESM and 
MIROC-ESM) and accounting also for land-based ice melt uncertainty (low, medium, and 
high). The economy-wide assessment is conducted with ICES-XPS, a multi-sector and multi-
region CGE model enhanced with a detailed description of the public sector. Planned 
adaptation against SLR takes the form of public investments and expenditures for 
maintenance addressing the building sector. This expenditure is funded by issuing 
government bonds. 
In a scenario where there is no additional adaptation, all world regions suffer a GDP loss. The 
most damaged countries are in Asia. When coastal protection takes place, the highest GDP 
gains compared to the case of no protection are observed mostly in Asian countries where 
SLR impacts are markedly high and adaptation expenditures particularly effective. In the 
remaining regions GDP gains are also experienced. The beneficial effect of adaptation on 
GDP is the result of two mechanisms. The first one regards the avoided direct impacts (i.e. 
loss of labour productivity, land, and capital). The second one is the public deficit effect. When 
adaptation to SLR reduces GDP losses, it also triggers a tax interaction effect which produces 
higher tax revenues for most regions, and lower public expenditures for Asian countries. 
Therefore, with lower deficits governments borrow less from households’ savings and pay a 
lower debt service both of which allows for an increased capital accumulation and growth in 
the long run. This result is particularly interesting as the reduction of public deficits is one of 
the elements that contribute to increase savings, investments and eventually growth after 
adaptation has taken place. 
Eventually, our study supports the intuition that large investments in adaptation not only can 
sustain, as amply acknowledged, GDP growth and development (being the avoided damages 
higher than adaptation costs), but also that this pro-growth push can be strong enough to 
trigger public debt reductions even when adaptation is financed in deficit spending. In general, 
this confirms the potential high returns of investment in adaption. This can be an important 
policy message either for countries where increasing tax pressures are particularly 
problematic or for those highly indebted countries where borrowing at competitive rates can be 
difficult. The former could think to use debt to finance their adaptation plans. The latter might 
find it easier to get funds on the market if they are earmarked toward adaptation investments 
that can be perceived as an element reducing the risk of no payback. This raises the issue of 
the different results that one could obtain through, for instance, earmarked taxation for 
adaptation that can potentially trigger different dynamics on debt accumulation and thus on the 
consumption-investment balance and growth. This will be a topic for future analysis. 
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Fig. 1 Impacts on real GDP by region, SSP, and RCP in 2050 (with and without additional 
adaptation) 
 
Figure1
 
Fig. 2 Impacts on public deficit by region, SSPs and RCPs in 2050 (with and without 
additional adaptation) 
 
Figure2
 Fig. 3 Impacts on public deficit by SSP and RCP for selected regions (with and without 
additional adaptation) 
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Fiscal effects and the potential implications on economic growth of 
sea-level rise impacts and coastal zone protection  
 
1. Introduction 
Sea-level rise (SLR) threatens coastal zones, through salinization, flooding, erosion, land loss 
(Hoegh-Guldberg et al. 2018; Wong et al. 2014; Nicholls et al. 2007; Nicholls et al 1999), and 
damage to property and infrastructure, which along with associated disruptions could result in 
adverse economic effects unless adaptation is undertaken. As coastal zones contain large 
population densities and economic activities (World Bank, 2010; Neumann et al. 2015; 
McGranahan et al. 2007) compared with further inland, it is important to project the wider 
economic effects of adverse change. With rates of sea-level riseSLR projected to accelerate 
(Church et al. 2013) and increasing populations and socioeconomic development, a larger 
number of people and assets will be at risk from coastal inundation unless further action is 
undertaken (Wong et al., 2014). For example, according to Hinkel et al. (2014) with 0.25m – 
1.23m of sea-level riseSLR in 2100 and no further adaptation, millions of people may be 
flooded, and annual losses may be 0.3%-9.3% of GDP. Globally, the broad impacts and direct 
costs of SLR and adaptation have been well identified (e.g. Hinkel et al. 2015), but the wider 
macro-economic implications have not been fully analysed yet.  
One particular macro-economic dimension of SLR impacts that has received no attention so 
far is the potential stress on public budgets. This issue was initially introduced, in broader 
terms, by Heller (2003) indicating climate change as one of the major threats posed on public 
budgets in future decades along with demographic changes. On the one hand, fiscal revenues 
could be significantly reduced in countries depending on few climate sensitive economic 
sectors. On the other hand, public spending may increase to prevent impacts such as 
intensified incidence of vector borne diseases, population movements or stress on 
infrastructures. Against this background, public budgets could become affected by climate 
change as decreasing revenues along with rising expenditures would erode public sector’s 
ability to pay, especially if long-term economic growth potential becomes compromised (Farid 
et al., 2016).  
Most of the discussion and research on fiscal effects has however focused on mitigation 
because of the direct effects on public budgets through variations in tax revenues due to 
policy implementation. There is a vast literature, developed especially during the 1990s, 
dealing with fiscal implications of carbon-energy taxes, revenue rising potential, re-
distributional implications, as well as costs and fiscal efficiency of green fiscal reforms (see 
e.g. Park and Pezzey, 1998; Bosello et al., 2001; and Schoeb, 2005 for surveys).  Much 
thinner is the literature concerning fiscal implications of climate change impacts and 
adaptation. Ekins and Speck (2013) discuss extensively the fiscal sustainability concept in 
relation with climate change impacts and policies highlighting the need to investigate their 
connections. Jones et al. (2013) review the corresponding fiscal challenges posed by climate 
change mitigation and adaptation describing climate change as a fiscal issue and stressing 
the fact that climate change impacts will indirectly affect government revenues and 
expenditures. Within the disaster risk management literature Hochrainer-Stigler et al. (2014) 
focus on the fiscal implications of climate-related impacts by employing risk-based modelling 
techniques, and considering estimates related to current climate which could be used as a 
baseline for discussion of projected risks.  
For completeness, it is worth finally mentionmentioning the studies providing quantifications of 
adaptation costs and finance needs for adaptation (see e.g. Buchner et al. 2015, UNEP 2016). 
Manuscript Click here to access/download;Manuscript;Revised Manuscript
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Nonetheless, macro-economic assessments investigating this issue are scarce. Still, using a 
systemic approach able to address all direct and indirect effects on the economy can be useful 
as emphasized by Ekins and Speck (2013). Consolidated tools for assessing economy-wide 
effects are Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models which include feedbacks and 
interdependencies between different markets. Indeed, CGE analyses have been widely 
applied to the economic assessment of climate change impact, but fiscal consequences have 
been somewhat left aside. To the best of our knowledge, only Bachner and Bednar-Friedl 
(2018) addressed with a CGE model how public budgets are affected by climate change. 
Investigating ten different impact areas in Austria, they find that macro-economic feedback 
effects on the overall tax base double the initial direct effect on the expenditure side of public 
budgets.  
Applying this approach to study fiscal implications of coastal protection is relevant as, on the 
one hand, the vast majority of investments against SLR in Europe are indeed publicly financed 
(CEPS and ZEW 2010, Nicholls et al.2010). On the other hand, insufficient protection would 
anyway increase public expenditure through disaster relief payments and compensation 
schemes. Both channels will affect public budgets. Eventually, adaptation could reduce or 
increase the stress on public budgets depending on its effectiveness, the structure of the tax 
system, the size of adaptation investment, and the funding sources available (Osberghaus 
and Reif 2010). 
It is also important to highlight the difference between mitigation and planned adaptation. The 
impact of the former on public budgets is much more direct, especially when implemented 
through carbon energy taxes or subsidies. The latter operates mostly through regulation or 
through public expenditure programs that are not financed by dedicated taxes, but by the 
general taxation. Thus, the budgetary implications are more difficult to track.    
A wide range of studies assess economic impacts of climate change-induced SLR using CGE 
models either analysing SLR as a single impact (Darwin and Tol 2001; Bosello et al. 2007; 
Bosello et al. 2012a; Pycroft et al. 2015 and Tol et al. 2016, Joshi et al., 2016), or including 
SLR as part of a wider set of impacts (Deke et al. 2001; Bigano et al. 2008; Eboli et al. 2010; 
Ciscar et al. 2009, 2011, 2012, 2014, 2018; Aaheim et al. 2012; Roson and van der 
Mensbrugge 2012; Bosello et al. 2012b; Dellink et al. 2014; OECD 2015).  
The main contribution of this paper is to address, differently from the abovementioned studies, 
the missing inclusion of fiscal indicators in climate change impact and adaptation 
assessments. Additional differences of this paper compared to previous studies are 
considering: i) the inclusion of damages of extreme sea-level events, i.e. those related to 1-
10,000 year flood, jointly and ii) including those damages as capital stock losses in a recursive 
dynamic setting. The focus of previous CGE studies is the gradual loss of capital stock related 
to land submerged by mean sea-level examined in comparative static exercises. Extreme sea-
level events, although less frequent, could potentially induce a much higher damage on 
coastal assets, dynamic effects on growth and higher demand for protection. We acknowledge 
that single extreme events can cause damages much higher than the expected damages, and 
that properly assessing extreme events would require a different approach. However, the 
expected damages give an indication where high damages could potentially occur and also 
allow for an assessment over longer time periods where single extreme events are included 
as part of long-term average damages. 
In this paper SLR is investigated with a recursive-dynamic CGE model extended with a 
detailed description of the public sector (Delpiazzo et al. 2017) that enables the analysis of 
macro-economic effects of adaptation and impacts on public budgets. More specifically, we 
evaluate the economic implication of SLR-induced land and capital losses as well as labour 
productivity effects due to temporary labour force displacements without and with coastal 
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protection financed issuing government bonds. The choice to support adaptation through 
public borrowing and not taxation is made on purpose, to study consequences in a potentially 
more stressful conditions for public funds.   
We examine several SLR scenarios originated by linking three different Representative 
Concentration Pathways (RCP): RCP 2.6, 4.5 and 8.5 (produced by two climate models), and 
two Shared Socio-economic Pathways (SSP): SSP2 and SSP5 while accounting for 
uncertainty in land-based ice melt. This combination allows us to span low, medium and high 
climate change futures and to account for different types of socio-economic development, and 
accordingly, different exposure to SLR: a medium one (SSP2) and a high one related to higher 
GDP and different population at risk (SSP5). 
 For these scenarios, future projections of direct damages of mean and extreme SLR and 
adaptation costs are generated by the Dynamic Interactive Vulnerability Assessment (DIVA) 
modelling framework (Hinkel et al 2013, 2014; Vafeidis et al. 2008), an integrated socio-
economical and geo-bio-physical model.  
As a final disclaimer: it is important to stress that we do not aim to perform an analysis of SLR 
risk. CGE models have many shortcomings under this respect. Rather, we apply CGE 
modelling to get insights of higher order effects on long-term debt sustainability of climate 
change impacts and adaptation expenditure in the specific context of coastal protection. 
 
2. Methodology 
Following a conceptual model from Sue Wing and Fisher-Vanden (2013), adaptation 
measures can be classified in three types. Type I is related to market-driven (autonomous) 
adaptation triggered by price signals. Type II refers to specific protective/defensive measures 
to reduce physical impacts. Type III consists of further compensating measures (e.g. fiscal 
policies) that reduce the adverse effects on economic sector’s productivity. Type I is standard 
in CGE models that feature endogenous price adjustments, but also the last two types, 
building the so-called planned adaptation, have ample potential to be implemented in CGE 
models (Sue Wing and Fisher-Vanden 2013).  
In the case of SLR, coastal protection expenditures mainly consist of large infrastructure 
expenditures which are primarily financed by public funds. According to CEPS and ZEW 
(2010) more than 95% of investments against SLR in Europe are publicly funded. Nicholls et 
al. (2010) suggest that much of the costs for adaptation to SLR falls on government finance 
while only a minority of adaptation (i.e. port and harbour upgrade) could be funded by private 
investments.  
Against this background, this work implements in a recursive-dynamic CGE model, public 
planned expenditures targeted to coastal protection inclusive of investment and maintenance 
costs corresponding to Type II adaptation measures. Cost estimation of coastal defences, 
consisting in sea dikes to protect against flooding, stems from the DIVA model. These are 
empirically derived based on a ‘demand for safety’ function based on per-capita income and 
population density (Hinkel et al. 2014 see Section 2.3). The DIVA model does not account for 
autonomous (Type I) adaptation, this is captured by the CGE model where resources allocate 
across sectors and countries responding to changes in relative prices.  
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2.1. Overview of the ICES-XPS model 
The economic assessment is based on an extended version of the ICES CGE model used in 
climate change impact and policy assessments (Bosello and Parrado 2014; Bosello et al. 
2012b; Eboli et al 2010). The basic version is a recursive-dynamic multi-sector multi-country 
CGE model derived from the GTAP model (Hertel et al. 1997). Like many global CGE models, 
ICES proposes a simplified representation of government behaviour. 
  
The original demand side in the model is represented by a utility maximizing regional 
household that allocates its income among private expenditure, public (government) 
expenditure, and savings. A budget constraint exists for the regional household as a whole but 
not for the government. Accordingly, government expenditures could, for instance, move in the 
opposite direction to taxes. Public debt and deficit are ignored, therefore the possibility for the 
public sector to save is not considered at all. This representation offers many advantages 
allowing for a single utility characterizing the demand side and avoiding complex public sector 
data issues on availability and homogeneity (for a more technical discussion refer to Delpiazzo 
et al. 2017 and Hertel 1997). However, it is inadequate when effects on public spending, like 
that of adaptation, have to be evaluated. To address this issue, we use the ICES-XPS (ICES-
eXtended Public Sector)1 model which features the government as a separate actor with its 
own budget constraint. Government transfers, consumption, and investments build 
government expenditure, while government income derives from taxes. At the regional level 
investments can be both private and public and are homogeneous. Furthermore, the model 
now includes items such as transfers between governments and households, and interest 
payments on debt stock. There are also transfers among governments.  
 
This section presents a short description of the public sector’s budget. A detailed description 
of the public sector is in Appendix A of the Supplementary Material (SM). In ICES-XPS, the 
government is a separate agent, whose income is affected by: (i) tax revenues (𝑇𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑟); (ii) 
net transfers to private households (𝑁𝑇𝑃𝐻𝑟); (iii) net interest payments to resident and non- 
resident households (𝑌𝐺𝐼𝑟); and (iv) net foreign transfers among governments (𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑟). 
Government income is used for consumption (𝐺𝑂𝑉_𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑟) and savings (𝑆𝐴𝑉_𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑟). The 
following two equations represent the government income respect to sources and uses. 
𝑌𝐺𝑟 = 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑟 + 𝑁𝑇𝑃𝐻𝑟 − 𝑌𝐺𝐼𝑟 + 𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑟 
𝑌𝐺𝑟 = 𝐺𝑂𝑉_𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑟 + 𝑆𝐴𝑉_𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑟 
Total regional investments are modelled through a Cobb-Douglas function of private and 
public investments. Regional investment net of depreciation (𝑁𝐸𝑇𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑟) is split into public 
(𝐺𝑂𝑉_𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑟) and private investments (𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑉_𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑟) according to fixed shares. 
𝑁𝐸𝑇𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑟 = 𝐺𝑂𝑉_𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑟 + 𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑉_𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑟 
The gap between public savings and public investments represent the government’s financial 
needs (borrowing). This gap is financed by households’ savings, since both domestic and 
foreign households supply a homogenous saving commodity. 
𝐺𝐵𝑂𝑅𝑟 = 𝐺𝑂𝑉_𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑟 − 𝑆𝐴𝑉_𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑟 
                                               
1 The detailed description of the public sector in the ICES-XPS and the regional aggregation is in 
Appendix A of the Supplementary Material (SM). 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
 5 
 
A positive value of 𝐺𝐵𝑂𝑅𝑟 means a deficit, thus the government is borrowing, while a negative 
sign means a surplus so that the government is lending resources. Then, public debt at the 
end of year t (GDEBTt,r) accumulates by adding current government’s borrowing (𝐺𝐵𝑂𝑅𝑡,𝑟) to 
the existing debt stock (𝐺𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑡−1,𝑟). 
𝐺𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑡,𝑟 = 𝐺𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑡−1,𝑟 + 𝐺𝐵𝑂𝑅𝑡,𝑟 
Interest payments on government’s debt stock (𝑌𝐺𝐼𝑟) are determined by a constant 
exogenous interest rate (𝑖𝑟𝑟=4%) multiplied by the related previous year debt stock.
2 
𝑌𝐺𝐼𝑡,𝑟 = 𝑖𝑟𝑟 ∙ 𝐺𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑡−1,𝑟 
 
Since public and private savings are homogenous goods, private households lend a fraction of 
their savings to governments and, as a consequence, governments pay interests to 
households. Thus, government borrowing reduces the available savings for productive 
investment purposes which in its turn will increase private sector interest rates given that 
investments demand will face a lower savings supply. Note that these interest rates are 
different from the constant interest rate set for public debt. 
 
The remaining features of ICES-XPS are similar to ICES. Output is produced by a 
representative firm in each sector using primary factors (land, labour, natural resources, 
capital), and other goods and services. Capital and labour are perfectly mobile domestically 
but immobile internationally. All data is available at the regional level and there is no distinction 
between urban and rural dimensions. Investment is allocated across countries to equalize 
expected rates of return to capital in the long-run. Savings and investments are equalized at 
the world level, but each region could have an imbalance between disposable savings and 
investment demand. This imbalance is closed by a surplus/deficit in foreign transactions 
(considered as the sum of trade surpluses/deficits and the net inflows of international 
transfers). In this context, government borrowing reduces the availability of regional savings 
with a consequent increase in saving prices which are negatively correlated to the rate of 
return to capital.  
2.2 Implementing adaptation in ICES-XPS model 
In our set up, ‘Planned Adaptation’ in coastal protection means investing in protective 
infrastructure, such as dikes to safeguard coastal zones where there are high population 
densities. Once these measures have been put in place (and assuming that maintenance 
occurs to ensure their effectiveness) only a residual damage will remain. However, adaptation 
is costly. Costs are of two types: i) investments in protective infrastructure, and ii) maintenance 
costs. We draw this information from DIVA (see next section). 
                                               
2 The assumption that public debt is always refinanced at a constant rate is in fact a coarse 
simplification of the real world, ruling out the possibility to link interest rates to perceived changes in the 
debt-risk profile of a region (more on this on the discussion section). A straightforward alternative would 
have been to set the interest rate for public debt at the regional rates of return to capital endogenously 
computed by the CGE model. However, these are in fact decreasing in all our scenarios, as the 
embedded growth assumptions imply higher capital supply. As a consequence, the burden of the public 
debt would actually decrease leading perhaps to too optimistic conclusions about debt sustainability. 
The further option to model a more sophisticated public debt system with international capital markets 
and a financial module is left to further research. 
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It is assumed that both expenditures are financed by private savings, through households 
buying government bonds. Thus, adaptation expenditures reduce the availability of savings for 
investment purposes. Furthermore, while expenditure in dike construction is accounted as 
public investment, maintenance costs expand government recurrent expenditure.  
Public investments with additional adaptation to cope with SLR (GOVINV_AD) in region r 
become:  
𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑁𝑉_𝐴𝐷𝑟 = 𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑟 + ∆𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐶𝑁𝑆𝑇,𝑟 
Where GOVINVr represents the initial public investments of region r, and ∆GOVINVCNST,r 
represents the additional public investment in infrastructure for the construction of dikes.  
Total recurrent government expenditures in region r (TQGr) is the sum of each recurrent 
expenditure (QGi,r) in good or service i: 
𝑇𝑄𝐺𝑟 = ∑ 𝑄𝐺𝑖,𝑟
𝑛
𝑖
 
Maintenance costs are additional recurrent public expenditures addressed to the construction 
sector that provides maintenance services (i=CNST). Similar to public investments with 
adaptation, the government demand for construction services with additional adaptation 
(QG_ADCNST,r) becomes: 
𝑄𝐺_𝐴𝐷𝐶𝑁𝑆𝑇,𝑟 =  𝑄𝐺𝐶𝑁𝑆𝑇,𝑟 + ∆𝑄𝐺𝐶𝑁𝑆𝑇,𝑟 
which ends up increasing total recurrent government expenditure by the same amount 
(∆QGCNST,r) to obtain total recurrent government expenditure with additional adaptation 
(TQG_ADr)  
𝑇𝑄𝐺_𝐴𝐷𝑟 = ∑ 𝑄𝐺𝑖,𝑟
𝑛
𝑖
+ ∆𝑄𝐺𝐶𝑁𝑆𝑇,𝑟 
This way of modelling adaptation expenditures implies that total public expenditure expands, 
and so does the public deficit, which is financed with private savings. This ends up reducing 
total savings each year. Due to public borrowing, interest payments increase which also 
augments the public deficit in the future. Hence, by conveying part of household savings to the 
funding of adaptation expenditures, planned adaptation decreases the total resources 
available to invest and build capital stock.3  
Therefore, this assessment can verify whether or not the lower growth of capital stock induced 
by adaptation is more than compensated by the lower climate-change induced losses on 
capital, land stock, and labour productivity; and how all this affects public budgets.   
                                               
3 This way to model adaptation rules out the possibility for adaptation (and more generally public) 
expenditure to be expansive through multiplier effects. The model however is a general equilibrium one, 
with growth originated by savings and not by Keynesian demand-driven effects. Adding that feature to 
public adaptation would imply extending it also to all form of consumption changing the nature of model.  
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2.3 Sea-level rise impacts and adaptation costs 
The direct damage costs of SLR and of coastal protection (building of sea dikes) are derived 
from the DIVA framework (Hinkel et al. 2014; Hinkel et al. 2013; Hinkel et al. 2012; Hinkel and 
Klein 2009). Sea-level riseSLR leads to a range of coastal impacts including loss of land due 
to submergence by gradual sea-level riseSLR, damage to coastal assets due to higher 
extreme sea-level events, impeded drainage, salinity intrusion, enhanced coastal erosion and 
wetland change (Wong et al. 2014). Here we cover only the first two types of impacts as 
global impact estimates of the other types of impacts are difficult to obtain.  
Residual impacts depend on adaptation measures that in DIVA take the form of dike building. 
DIVA computes protection standards, directly connected to the height of dikes, for over 12,000 
sections of the world’s coast based on an empirically derived demand for safety function that 
is increasing with per-capita income and population density (Hinkel et al. 2014). The dike 
building process is stylized as data to derive current and future protection levels worldwide 
with higher granularity are not available. The demand for safety and thus of higher dikes 
depends positively on the sea-level riseSLR stressors (extreme water level), GDP per capita 
and population density. Accordingly, in DIVA coastal protection and the related costs - that 
include construction and annual maintenance costs - change because of environmental and 
socio-economic drivers (for further detail see Hinkel et al 2014). Results used in this paper 
differ from previous assessments (e.g. Ciscar et al 2012) due to new science and 
accompanying data (e.g. extreme water levels from Muis et al. 2017), and DIVA model 
upgrades.. This includes new data sets on extreme water levels (Muis et al. 2017), 
topographic data (Jarvis et al., 2008; USGS, 2015), land level data relating to glacial isostatic 
adjustment (Peltier 2004), population exposed to flooding (Balk et al., 2006; CIESIN et al., 
2011) and re-writing of algorithms with the latest science, such as a statistically derived asset 
to gross domestic product ratio based on Hallegatte et al. (2013) with the digital elevation data 
and depth-damage curves (Hinkel et al. 2014). 
Direct impacts and adaptation costs are computed for a “No additional adaptation scenario”, 
assuming constant protection at 1995 levels and for a “With adaptation scenario”, where the 
demand for safety increases with increasing affluence and higher dikes are built with rising 
sea-levels. The costs of coastal protection include construction and annual maintenance 
costs. Information is available in 5-year time steps. 
The No additional adaptation scenario could be considered not very realistic given that 
protection levels will not actually be frozen at 1995 levels. Nonetheless, this is a necessary 
reference point to enable a full account of the potential future contribution of adaptation 
expenditure on public budgets.  
For each combination of SLR and socio-economic scenario (with no additional adaptation and 
with adaptation), the following DIVA model output were used as input to ICES-XPS: 
a) Annual land loss due to submergence (km²/year): Land is considered to be 
unusable, and thus lost, if it is situated below the 1-in-1 year flood water level and 
not protected by a dike. 
b) Expected annual damages to assets by sea floods (million US$/year): 
mathematical expectation of damages to assets integrating from the 1-in-1 year 
flood to the 1-in-10,000 year flood. 
c) Expected annual number of people flooded per year (thousands/year): 
mathematical expectation of damages to people integrating from the 1-in-1 year 
flood to the 1-in-10,000 year flood. 
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d) Annual cost of construction of new dikes as well as raising of existing dikes (million 
US$/year).  
e) Annual cost of maintaining existing dikes, projected at 1% of capital costs (million 
US$/year). Dikes that are overtopped by rising sea-level are no longer maintained. 
For a consistent flow of information across the two models, all values from DIVA, expressed in 
US$ PPP (Purchasing Power Parity) were converted to US$ MER (Market Exchange Rate), 
the ICES-XPS reference, using the conversion factors from the World Development Indicators 
(World Bank 2017). The physical and economic data of the spatially resolved DIVA model 
were aggregated to match the ICES-XPS regions. Then we calculated the ratio of each 
monetary value to the corresponding GDP for each SSP. Finally, those ratios were applied to 
the ICES-XPS GDP database to compute the corresponding monetary values to be included 
as input for the CGE simulations.  
As in previous CGE assessments (Bosello et al. 2007, 2012a, 2012b), we assume that SLR 
impacts affect regional performances through land loss, labour productivity loss, and capital 
loss. The first is implemented in ICES-XPS decreasing the stock of productive land available 
to agriculture assuming this coincides with submerged land, which is commonly observed. 
Labour productivity is reduced assuming that people flooded are not able to work for 2 
working weeks per year.4 Capital stock is decreased according to the expected annual 
damages to assets by sea floods. This presupposes that all countries of the world would 
experience in every year a flood that provokes exactly the expected damage. We 
acknowledge this is unrealistic, but we keep this assumption for simplicity noting that our 
results, under this respect, can be placed in the high-range of damage estimates.5  
It is also worth noting that this is the first time that we are able to include explicit estimates of 
capital losses. Previous assessments run with prior versions of the same CGE model did not 
include them at all (Bigano et al, 2008; Bosello et al. 2012a; Eboli et al. 2010), or followed a 
rather coarse method imposing the same loss of land stock on capital stock (Bosello et al. 
2007, Bosello et al. 2012b, Bosello and Parrado 2014). This is an improvement to our impact 
analysis, and therefore, we should expect higher economy-wide impacts in this study.  
 
2.4 Scenarios 
The main drivers of the DIVA model are sea-level riseSLR and the evolution of population 
density and gross domestic product (GDP). Projections for both variables associated to two 
Shared Socioeconomic Pathways - SSP (O’Neill et al. 2014): SSP2 “Middle of the Road” and 
SSP5 “Fossil-fuelled development”, both available at IIASA (2016) have been used in this 
study. The evolution of GDP, population, and capital stock for both scenarios is shown on 
Figure SM 1 of the Supplementary Material (SM).  
                                               
4 This value is rather arbitrary and derives from assumptions made in Bosello et al (2012b) on the 
period of time that people will not be able to work after being affected by river floods. To control for the 
weight of this assumption we run a sensitivity analysis considering 1, 2, 4 and 6 weeks for the No 
Adaptation scenario with high SLR. Applying these periods does not change the final outcome of our 
estimates. There is some variability on impacts at the aggregate level for North Europe and Asian 
countries, but these variations do not change the overall results of our study. As a final remark, it has to 
be noted that the labour productivity effect represents anyway a minor share (1% to 16%) of the total 
impact. 
5 We acknowledge that the probability of this happening in reality is null. Addressing this would, 
however, require a quite different approach such as a Monte-Carlo analysis which we plan to address in 
the future.  
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SLR scenarios generated from two climate models: Nor-ESM (Bentsen et al. 2013) and 
MIROC-ESM (Watanabe et al. 2011) and for three Representative Concentration Pathways 
(van Vuuren et al. 2011) were analysed: RCPs 2.6, 4.5, and 8.5. Furthermore, to account for 
uncertainty in land-based ice melt, the 5%, 50%, and 95% percentiles ice melting uncertainty 
were considered as representing a ‘very likely’ range for low, medium, and high SLR estimates 
in each scenario (see Figure SM 2). These regionalised (patterned) sea-level riseSLR 
scenarios are taken from Hinkel et al. (2014).6  
The general equilibrium analysis is developed comparing the adaptation scenarios against a 
reference scenario. 
Reference (no impact): Considering only the socio-economic scenarios based on the SSP2 
and SSP5. These scenarios do not include any impact from SLR.  
No additional adaptation: Including SLR impacts, as reported in section 2.3 and considering 
both socio-economic development and sea-level rise.SLR. This represents a counter factual 
scenario with adaptation frozen at 1995 protection levels.  
With additional adaptation: Including public intervention to protect coastal zones against 
SLR as prescribed by the DIVA framework, considering both socio-economic development and 
sea-level riseSLR, including residual damages, imposed according to the description in 
section 2.3. In ICES-XPS we take into account only the additional costs for maintenance of 
the new infrastructure. Maintenance costs related to existing protection infrastructures are not 
a consequence of climate change impacts (Hinkel et al., 2014) and are thus assumed to be 
part of the reference scenario.  
3. Results 
Direct impacts of SLR and coastal protection provided by DIVA are summarised in Appendix D 
of the SM. Benefits are higher than costs, as amply recognised by an extended literature. This 
information constitutes the main input for the following CGE analysis meant to capture the 
economy-wide feedbacks and fiscal effects of protecting coastal zones, i.e. the role of 
autonomous adaptation.  
Macro-economic effects are summarised in Figure 1 comparing impacts on regional GDP by 
SSP for RCPs 2.6, 4.5, and 8.5 in 2050 with and without additional adaptation (full results are 
reported in Figure SM 5). The figure includes a boxplot with whiskers computed using 1.5 
times the interquartile range showing outliers outside that interval. The No additional 
adaptation scenarios feature a generalized GDP loss in all regions for all RCPs directly 
dependent on the size of impacts on capital, land, and labour productivity. The most affected 
region is China, which shows also a higher variability in impacts, with an average GDP loss of 
10% for SSP5 and 8.6% for SSP2. South Asia is the second most affected region in SSP5 
with an average GDP loss of 7.2% but a much lower one for SSP2 (3.3%). East Asia shows 
also high losses (SSP5: 5.6%, SSP2: 4.6%); along with North Europe (SSP5: 5.3%, SSP2: 
4.4%). In the rest of Asian countries, Middle East, Africa, Canada, Europe, Oceania, USA, 
Latin America and the Caribbean, GDP could decrease on average around 4% to 2%. The 
rest of the Former Soviet Union and Sub Saharan Africa show lower impacts with narrower 
loss intervals and an average below than 2% of GDP. 
 
                                               
6 The regional patterns are from the Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets and their peripheral glaciers 
and ice caps, plus from the steric contribution of sea-level rise.SLR. A global mean value is added to the 
regionalised components from glaciers and ice caps in other parts of the world. 
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Fig. 1 Impacts on real GDP by region, SSP, and RCP in 2050 (with and without additional 
adaptation) 
 
 
By comparing results between SSP5 and SSP2, it emerges that higher growth implies higher 
exposure and impacts. As in the case of direct impacts, the variability in macro-economic 
results induced by differences in socioeconomic development is higher than that associated to 
the climate scenarios. This is a consequence of the time profile of our exercise, as by mid-
century, climate signals are quite similar across RCPs. The macro-economic benefits of 
coastal protection are substantial. Figure 1 clearly highlights the ability of adaptation to reduce 
GDP losses, particularly evident in those regions like Asian countries, where sea-level riseSLR 
has more pronounced impacts.  
This positive result of adaptation is the compounded effect of two mechanisms directly and 
indirectly related with SLR impacts. The first one regards the avoided direct impacts (loss of 
labour productivity, land, and capital). In this case, the avoided capital loss is the main driver 
of adaptation benefits, not only because of their size, but also due to their key role in 
determining growth in a recursive dynamic model like ICES-XPS.  
 
 
Fig. 2 Impacts on public deficit by region, SSPs and RCPs in 2050 (with and without 
additional adaptation) 
 
 
The second mechanism is the public deficit effect (Figure 2 and Figure 3) that has an indirect 
consequence on GDP growth. In 2050, without adaptation, all regions increase their public 
deficits or reduce their surpluses respect to the reference scenario. Region-specific results are 
strictly dependent on the tax system structure, and on the interaction between input taxes 
(affected by the negative effects on land, capital, and labour), and output taxes (affected by 
the decline in GDP). Public deficit expansion in non-Asian countries is mainly driven by the 
reduction in GDP and consequently lower tax revenues. In contrast, countries from Asia and 
the Middle East enlarge their deficit mainly due to an increase of public expenditures. This is 
due to the fact that these regions, being highly damaged by SLR experience a noticeable rise 
in prices due to a loss of endowments, in particular capital stock. This directly affects 
government expenditures. These increases can be substantive in absolute terms. In RCP8.5 
and high SLR for instance, they amount in 2050 to more than $800 billion in China, $236 
billion in Latin America and the Caribbean, $180 billion in India, and $171 billion in East Asia. 
Full results including decomposition of fiscal effects during the period 2008-2050 are reported 
in Figure SM 6, Figure SM 7, Figure SM 8, and Figure SM 9.  
A higher deficit implies higher government borrowing from household savings which eventually 
reduces also the available resources for private investments, decreasing capital accumulation 
and growth in the medium- and long-run.  
Adaptation translates the lower impacts of SLR into lower deficits with the government 
borrowing less from households which would allow for an increased capital accumulation in 
the long-run. Lower deficits imply also lower debt accumulation and a lower debt service. This 
allows more resources devoted to growth. Note that this result holds even though adaptation 
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is funded issuing public debt. Figure 3 highlights the patterns in the evolution of deficit (with 
and without additional adaptation) in selected regions for the period 2007-2035. Initially, public 
deficits are in fact higher when adaptation investments are being put in place, but in the longer 
run they become lower as increasingly negative impacts are avoided. In the long-term GDP 
losses and public deficits would be much higher without adaptation (see Figure SM 5 and 
Figure SM 6). Eventually, according to the ICES-XPS analysis, the protection investments 
prescribed by DIVA are also robust in a general equilibrium setup, i.e. accounting for the full 
economic interactions.  
 
Fig. 3 Impacts on public deficit by SSP and RCP for selected regions (with and without 
additional adaptation) 
 
 
Within this context and for the case of sea-level riseSLR, support to adaptation in deficit 
spending could improve GDP growth in the long-run and might trigger positive effects on 
public finance sustainability (see Figure SM 9 for the positive effect of adaptation in reducing 
the public deficit compared against the No additional adaptation case). 
  
4. Discussion 
MacroThis study’s macro-economic impacts of SLR are much higher than those reported by 
previous studies. For instance, the maximum loss from Bosello et al. (2007), Bigano et al, 
(2008), Eboli et al. (2010), Bosello et al. (2012a,b), and Bosello and Parrado (2014) is 0.4% of 
GDP in 2050. OECD (2015), which applies a similar methodology to simulate capital stock 
losses - i.e. capital decreases in pace with the land loss - estimated a maximum GDP 
contraction of less than 1% in the Asian region in 2050. The PESETA III study (Ciscar et al. 
2018) computes roughly a 0.3% GDP loss for the EU and around 0.5% for UK and Ireland. 
Our higher loss estimates are mainly due to three aspects. The first and most important is the 
use of extreme SLR estimates related to a 1-10,000 year flood which implies higher impact 
and adaptation costs. Related to this is the fact that capital losses have been estimated with 
the DIVA model and not inferred from land losses. The second, is the recursive dynamic 
setting that amplifies effects on growth compared to static exercises (as for instance Ciscar et 
al. 2009, 2011, 2012, 2014, 2018). The third, pertains finally to the inclusion of public 
borrowing effect that crowds savings out and therefore investments with a further negative 
impact on growth. This is more evident in the no additional adaptation-high SLR scenarios 
where governments face larger deficits. Note that results are driven by the cost estimates of 
the DIVA model (that generally features lower adaptation costs than GDP losses), which are 
then used in the CGE model to calculate the second order impacts and the fiscal impacts from 
undertaking adaptation investments or not. 
In the No Adaptation scenarios governments must borrow more resources than in the 
Adaptation scenarios. This is explained because in the No AdaptationIn the former scenarios 
governments increase their deficits (and public debts) due to lower tax revenues or increased 
current expenditures, then governmentsthey must borrow from private households to finance 
the deficit which ends up increasing public debt as well as the debt burden. On the contrary, in 
the Additional Adaptation scenarios, even though the government is borrowing to finance 
adaptation investments and maintenance costs, the benefits are higher than the burden of the 
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adaptation debt, since with adaptation governments have either higher tax revenues or lower 
current expenditures.  
Debt sustainability could be compromised if interest payments become a heavy burden in 
public debts either because governments are borrowing more to refinance the existing debt or 
because interest rates are increasing due to a higher public debt. The evolution of public 
deficits is a straightforwardan indicator that reveals if public debt is becoming unsustainable 
because it is increasing in time. By comparing the No adaptation scenarios against the 
Additional adaptation scenarios and looking at the changes in public deficits it is possible to 
find out which scenario has a more sustainable debt. Figure SM 9 shows explicitly the 
temporal profile for changes of public deficits thanks to SLR adaptation (black line) along with 
the deficit decomposition by its main components for one specific scenario (SSP2, RCP8.5 
and high SLR simulation scenario produced with the MIROC-ESM climate model). Debt is 
more sustainable in the Additional Adaptation scenarios due to higher tax revenues (blue 
area) in most of Non-Asian countries, while Asian countries improve their deficits with 
Adaptation thanks to lower expenditures (Orange area), and lower public debt interest 
payments (light orange area). Only North Europe shows a slight increase in public deficit after 
2030 and this is explained by the high investments in dike building that must be done by 2030 
and the corresponding increase in dike maintenance costs afterwards as shown in the second 
panel of Figure SM 10. For the rest of the countries, the adaptation expenditures (shown in 
Figure SM 10), do not represent an additional burden for debt sustainability even though they 
are financed with public debts through adaptation funds, they do not represent an additional 
burden for debt sustainability since the public deficit (black line in Figure SM 9) is always lower 
than in the No Adaptation scenarios.scenario.  
It is worth noting that some regions such as USA and North Europe may undertake higher 
adaptation expenditures than more vulnerable regions such as China and India (Figure SM 
10). This is because adaptation responds to a demand-for-safety function driven by socio-
economic indicators (GDP per capita and population density), that suggest higher protection 
levels (and thus higher costs) in richer areas like the USA and Northern Europe than in China 
and India. 
There are two features of the study that can underestimate, the first, and overestimate, the 
second, our results on growth and public finance. As to the first: it is well known that financing 
government expenditure through new debt can be particularly troublesome, especially for 
highly indebted countries, if this action is linked to a perception of increasing risk of payback. 
Markets will typically react asking for higher rewards and interest rates. This dynamic however 
is not present in our exercise which may lead to underestimate the cost of raising public fund. 
As said, the reference scenarios examined are all quite optimistic in terms of growth rates 
which implies in fact a decrease in interest rates (there is more capital supply). This decrease, 
albeit less pronounced, is present also in SLR scenarios. Thus, to avoid an excessive 
underestimation of the cost of a debt policy, we set a fixed public debt interest rate. A more 
realistic representation of the dynamics of interest rates would have required a substantive 
revision of the capital market that we leave for further work. Despite this, the private sector of 
each regional economy in the model still responds to endogenous interest rates that are 
higher when the more government borrows from households.  
This said, debt patterns in the adaptation scenarios, also in the initial simulation years when 
adaptation costs should prevail on benefits, do not change much compared with the baseline 
scenario. This would lead us to conclude that the debt-risk profile of the regions considered, 
will not be impacted too much by adaptation expenditure. Therefore, at the macro regional 
level considered at least, debt financing would not be rationed. However, this may not be the 
case for some individual countries. 
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The second feature refers to the inability to account for the expansive nature of adaptation 
expenditure on capital stock, whose positive effect is instead confined to damage reduction. 
This model feature can lead to underestimate the benefit of adaptation. There are indeed 
possible corrections for this, but this would imply to modify not just government consumption, 
but all the demand side of the model introducing multiplicative demand effects, a route that we 
did not follow. We acknowledge that this is a limitation of the approach. At the same time, 
correcting for it would have very likely strengthened our results.    
A third point regards the disaster relief payments that have been disregarded in our analysis. 
While these payments can constitute an important part of public budgets, including them in 
our CGE framework would have only increased the gap between the No Adaptation and 
Additional Adaptation scenarios. As a matter of fact, this kind of payments would have been 
financed by borrowing more resources from the private sector with the corresponding impact 
on economic growth, even though part of those resources would have returned to the 
economy in the form of reconstruction investments and expenditures. However, the final 
outcome of the analysis would have been similar. 
There is finally another important limitation inherent to a CGE assessment applied to the 
evaluation of extreme risk.7 Eventually, what done here is to assesswe assessed the indirect 
effects of expected annual losses. We tried to capture uncertainty through multi-scenario 
assessment, but the exercise remains basically a deterministic sensitivity analysis. 
Furthermore, the main mechanism at work (even though not the only one) are changes in 
relative prices. Both 
On the one hand, this applies to uncertainty related to the development of future 
socioeconomic scenarios. CGE models are meant to perform short to medium term analyses 
and are less reliable when the future can unfold quite differently from what implied by the 
calibrated parameterization. The standard way to deal with this issue is the one we followed 
here simulating different SSPs and providing a range of estimates taking into account diverse 
socioeconomic and climatic scenarios. On the other hand, it applies to SLR uncertainty. The 
main mechanism at work (even though not the only one) are changes in relative prices. These 
features are ill suited to capture either the propagation effects of disasters or their occurrence 
pattern. That would require full account of the whole probability distribution and potentially use 
of the apparatus of extreme value theory.  
In fact, our aim is not to perform a risk analysis. To do this, other methodologies would be 
more appropriated (see Pol and Hinkel (2018) for a discussion on SLR uncertainty).  Some 
studies adopt for instance probabilistic sea -level projections (e.g. Diaz, 2016). Decision 
analyses for coastal risk management also provide an alternative investigation approach 
which among other is able to represent more realistically local/site-specific features. Sahin and 
Mohamed (2014) combine a system dynamics model with a geographical information system 
for a spatial and temporal assessment of SLR. Tamura et al. (2019) use empirical econometric 
estimations to provide global economic assessments of SLR for different RCP/SSP 
combinations. 
Moreover, there could be other macro-economic, but non-neo-classical modelling approaches, 
that could emphasize different outcomes. As said, for instance, demand-driven Keynesian or 
post-Keynesian models can measure and compare the multipliers associated to public and 
private consumption and investment and remove the simplifying assumption of perfect market 
clearing. Introducing market distortions and output gap is surely an important addition to the 
                                               
7 We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out. 
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analysis of the public sector. Finally, the explicit introduction of financial markets could also 
provide different results based on the assumptions made.  
Still, we believe that applying CGE modelling can provide useful insights on the higher order 
effects of public expenditure on adaptation (in this case against SLR), by systemically linking 
and capturing endogenous feedbackfeedbacks across the taxation system, debt and debt 
services, GDP, and trade.  
On this note, this methodology could be applied to wider contexts than SLR to examine the 
effect of climate change adaptation measures when the public sector plays an important role 
in replacing or supporting private actions. An example in this vein is public support in disaster 
risk reduction (e.g. in the area of riverine floods) where both damages and public support are 
substantive. In other areas where private adaptation or insurance are working, (e.g. in the 
health sector) this approach can be less useful. 
 
Furthermore, the insights from our analysis support the idea of including long-term growth 
effects on cost-benefit analyses of climate change, considering also the trade-off between the 
adaptation (or mitigation) costs and long-term impacts that could accumulate in time affecting 
fiscal positions and growth in the long run. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper analyses the economic implications of publicly planned adaptation to protect 
coastal zones against SLR. Input to the analysis are labour productivity, land, and capital 
losses as well as coastal protection costs from DIVA model runs based on the combination of 
two SSPs (2 and 5), three RCPs (2.6, 4.5, and 8.5), two climate models (NorESM and 
MIROC-ESM) and accounting also for land-based ice melt uncertainty (low, medium, and 
high). The economy-wide assessment is conducted with ICES-XPS, a multi-sector and multi-
region CGE model enhanced with a detailed description of the public sector. Planned 
adaptation against SLR takes the form of public investments and expenditures for 
maintenance addressing the building sector. This expenditure is funded by issuing 
government bonds. 
In a scenario where there is no additional adaptation, all world regions suffer a GDP loss. The 
most damaged countries are in Asia. When coastal protection takes place, the highest GDP 
gains compared to the case of no protection are observed mostly in Asian countries where 
SLR impacts are markedly high and adaptation expenditures particularly effective. In the 
remaining regions GDP gains are also experienced. The beneficial effect of adaptation on 
GDP is the result of two mechanisms. The first one regards the avoided direct impacts (i.e. 
loss of labour productivity, land, and capital). The second one is the public deficit effect. When 
adaptation to SLR reduces GDP losses, it also triggers a tax interaction effect which produces 
higher tax revenues for most regions, and lower public expenditures for Asian countries. 
Therefore, with lower deficits governments borrow less from households’ savings and pay a 
lower debt service both of which allows for an increased capital accumulation and growth in 
the long run. This result is particularly interesting as the reduction of public deficits is one of 
the elements that contribute to increase savings, investments and eventually growth after 
adaptation has taken place. 
Eventually, our study supports the intuition that large investments in adaptation not only can 
sustain, as amply acknowledged, GDP growth and development (being the avoided damages 
higher than adaptation costs), but also that this pro-growth push can be strong enough to 
trigger public debt reductions even when adaptation is financed in deficit spending. In general, 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
 15 
 
this confirms the potential high returns of investment in adaption. This can be an important 
policy message either for countries where increasing tax pressures are particularly 
problematic or for those highly indebted countries where borrowing at competitive rates can be 
difficult. The former could think to use debt to finance their adaptation plans. The latter might 
find it easier to get funds on the market if they are earmarked toward adaptation investments 
that can be perceived as an element reducing the risk of no payback. This raises the issue of 
the different results that one could obtain through, for instance, earmarked taxation for 
adaptation that can potentially trigger different dynamics on debt accumulation and thus on the 
consumption-investment balance and growth. This will be a topic for future analysis. 
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